Effects of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Nursing Home Staffing and Quality of Care by Park, Jeongyoung & Stearns, Sally C.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Effects of State Minimum Staffing
Standards on Nursing Home Staffing
and Quality of Care
Jeongyoung Park and Sally C. Stearns
Objective. To investigate the impact of state minimum staffing standards on the level
of staffing and quality of nursing home care.
Data Sources. Online Survey and Certification Reporting System (OSCAR) merged
with the Area Resource File from 1998 through 2001.
Study Design. Between 1998 and 2001, 16 states implemented or expanded
staffing standards in excess of federal requirements, creating a natural experiment
in comparison with facilities in states without new standards. Difference-in-differ-
ences models using facility fixed effects were estimated to determine the effect of state
standards.
Data Collection/Extraction Methods. OSCAR data were linked to the data on
market conditions and state policies. A total of 55,248 facility-year observations from
15,217 freestanding facilities were analyzed.
Principal Findings. Increased standards resulted in small staffing increases for facil-
ities with staffing initially below or close to new standards. Yet the standards were
associated with reductions in restraint use and the number of total deficiencies at all
types of facilities.
Conclusions. Mandated staffing standards affect only low-staff facilities facing poten-
tial for penalties, and effects are small. Selected facility-level outcomes may show
improvement at all facilities due to a general response to increased standards or to other
quality initiatives implemented at the same time as staffing standards.
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Difference-in-differences
The quality of nursing home care is an important policy issue, especially given
the aging of the population. In response to concerns about persistent quality
problems in the 1970s, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (OBRA) of 1987, which raised minimum quality standards and strength-
ened federal and state oversight (Wiener 2003). Among various regulatory
processes, minimum staffing standards have become a major subject for
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debate because of the importance of nurse staffing to the processes and
outcomes of care (Harrington 2005a, b). The federal government strengthened
national standards through the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA) as part
of OBRA 87, which required nursing facilities to have (1) licensed nurses on
duty 24 hours a day; (2) a registered nurse (RN) on duty at least 8 hours a day,
7 days a week; and (3) an RN director of nursing. Yet many nursing homes
have had continuing quality problems despite the OBRA standards (GAO
1998, 1999, 2000).
Subsequently, many states mandated staffing standards, with some states
pursuing a broad array of reforms to help providers recruit and retain a
stable, well-trained workforce (PHI and NCDHHS 2004). By 2003, 36 states
supplemented the federal guidelines with more stringent standards requiring
either a certain number of nursing hours per resident day (HPRD) or a spec-
ified staff-to-resident or staff-to-bed ratio. From 1998 to 2001, 16 states
implemented or expanded minimum staffing standards with the goal of
improving quality of care.
While research has found that higher nursing home staffing leads to
higher quality of care (Cohen and Spector 1996; Harrington et al. 2000),
information on effects of recent changes in state staffing standards is scanty.
Researchers and policymakers had contradictory comments about the use
of staffing standards (GAO 2002). This paper investigates how changes in
state-mandated staffing standards from 1998 to 2001 affected the level of
staffing and quality of care.
BACKGROUND
Variation in State Minimum Staffing Standards
To participate in Medicare and Medicaid, nursing homes must meet federal
and state standards. Compliance is monitored through the annual survey and
certification process. Unless they apply for and receive an exemption, facilities
that are not compliant with staffing standards receive a deficiency and
are subject to sanctions (e.g., civil monetary penalties, denial of payment, or
termination depending on the scope and severity).
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Current federal staffing standards have not changed since 1987 and are
far below the levels in many facilities (Zhang and Grabowski 2004; Harrington
2005a, b). State standards are more stringent than federal mandated levels, so
more nursing homes may have to respond to the state standards than to federal
standards. Furthermore, as states gained additional flexibility in determining
state Medicaid policies with the repeal of the Boren Amendment in 1997, it is
important to understand whether state mandated staffing standards affect
staffing decisions and quality of care.
State staffing standards vary in terms of types of staff regulated and how
standards are defined (Harrington 2002; DHHS 2003). Of the 36 states with
standards, 29 set standards for total nursing staff and 27 states established
direct care staff standards. Thirty-two states have licensed nurse requirements
and nine states set specific RN requirements. Twenty-one states had staffing
mandates defined as staff HPRD, six states set mandates in ratios, and nine
states established standards in terms of both staff hours and ratios. While the
details differ by state, 16 states made major changes to existing standards
from 1998 to 2001 (Table 1). Fourteen states increased their standards, while
two states implemented new standards. Three states (Arkansas, Delaware, and
Oklahoma) made more comprehensive changes to requirements using a
phase-in period to implement standards by shift and staff type. No state
rescinded or lowered minimum requirement during the study period.
Prior Studies on Effects of Federal and State Minimum Staffing Standards
Several early studies examined the impact of federal staffing standards on nursing
home staffing and quality of care. Janelli, Kanski, and Neary (1994) found that the
implementation of federal standards in New York was associated with a decrease
in restraint use that occurred largely without an increase in staffing. Moseley
(1996) examined the 1990 implementation of NHRA legislation on catheter use
among Virginia nursing home residents and found that post-NHRA catheteriza-
tion rates were lower than the pre-NHRA rates. These studies, however, were
based on simple pre- and postcomparisons in one or several states.
Zhang and Grabowski (2004) used national data and stronger methods
to determine whether federal requirements led to higher quality. Using data
from 5,092 nursing homes from 22 states linked across the pre-NHRA (1987)
and post-NHRA (1993) period, they examined whether changes in staffing
were related to changes in quality before and after the federal standards.
Their study, which used a first-difference approach while controlling for
time-invariant factors across homes, did not find that NHRA was associated
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with better quality except in cases where facilities had substandard staffing in
the pre-NHRA period.
Two studies analyzed the relationship between state staffing standards
and staffing levels in nursing homes. Harrington (2005a, b) found that the
median nurse staffing level in 2000/2001 was substantially higher than each
state’s staffing standards, though these assessments were based on simple
comparisons. Mueller et al. (2006) found that facilities in states with high
standards had somewhat higher staffing on average than states with no or low
standards, whereas staffing levels in states with low standards were not
significantly different from staffing in states without standards.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Nearly two-thirds of nursing homes are for-profit facilities (Grabowski and
Norton 2006), which have strong incentives to choose the profit-maximizing
levels of quantity and quality of care. Nonprofit facilities may have different
goals from for-profit facilities but must operate efficiently to maintain financial
viability under competitive circumstances and so may try to maximize profits
(Konetzka, Norton, and Stearns 2004). Profit-maximization models have been
widely used in studying nursing home quality of care in face of regulatory
policies, including changes in payment method, payment level, and certificate
of need legislation (Scanlon 1980; Nyman 1985; Gertler 1989; Cohen and
Spector 1996; Konetzka, Norton, and Stearns 2004).
Within the profit-maximization model, nursing homes will produce
quantity and quality of care up to the point where the marginal cost of im-
provement equals the marginal financial gain from doing so. Federal or state
minimum standards serve as constraints for the quantity and mix of staffing
chosen by facilities, so that in theory nursing homes can only choose staffing at
or above the minimum regulation level (Cawley, Grabowski, and Hirth 2006).
If a facility’s staffing is below new standards, those facilities must increase their
staffing to become compliant with new standards in the next period to avoid
any penalty, or must apply for an exemption.
In reality, raising minimum staffing standards may involve substantial
production costs (i.e., labor cost for additional staff, administrative cost
to comply with standards) and cause some facilities to face severe financial
constraints. Some facilities may rationally decide to operate below the min-
imum standards if the cost of meeting standards exceeds the cost of noncom-
pliance. A study by Harrington and O’Meara (2006) reported that 64 percent
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of nursing homes in California did not meet the mandatory standards in
2000, and 27 percent of facilities failed to comply by 2003. A series of GAO
reports (1999, 2000) expressed concern that the state survey process and
enforcement activities are not strong enough to ensure compliance or better
quality of care.
Facilities with staffing in excess of new standards may not change staffing
or performance in response to new regulations because of lack of incentive for
improvement. Furthermore, as facilities with previously lower staffing hire
more staff, all nursing homes may have to pay higher wages given the limited
supply of nursing workers in the market. In this case, high-staff facilities may
substitute cheaper forms of labor (e.g., licensed practical nurses [LPNs], nurse
aides [NAs]) for more expensive forms (e.g., RNs) or they may simply reduce
the level of staffing.
Strategic decisions on staffing consequently affect the quality of care
provided. Increased staffing is hypothesized to result in higher quality. The
effects of new standards on quality might not be straightforward, however,
because increased demand for staffing and its consequent effects on quality
will depend at least in part on unobserved characteristics. Improvements
in organizational processes may cause a facility to achieve higher quality
even without increasing staffing hours. Nursing homes may also be able to
improve the productivity of nursing workers by increasing job satisfaction or
decreasing turnover.
General agreement exists about the factors that affect both input
and output decisions in the production of nursing home care. For example,
the acuity level of residents may be the most important factor in determin-
ing both staffing decisions and observed health outcomes. Facility character-
istics and market/state-specific environments affect both staffing and quality
of care. Among these factors, many studies found that for-profits have sig-
nificantly lower staffing and quality than nonprofits (Chou 2002; O’Neill
et al. 2003).
In this study, the marginal effects on both staffing and quality are es-
timated separately according to staffing level before new standards and own-
ership status to assess three hypotheses:
1. Increased state minimum staffing standards will increase the level of
staffing and quality of care in nursing homes.
2. Low-staff facilities (facilities with previous staffing levels below newly
mandated standards) are more likely to increase staffing and quality.
3. For-profit facilities are less likely to change staffing and quality.
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METHODS
Data Sources
Data on facility characteristics and quality measures came from Online Survey
and Certification Reporting System (OSCAR) from 1998 through 2001. The
OSCAR data are from state surveys of all federally certified Medicare-skilled
nursing facilities and Medicaid nursing facilities in the United States. The
OSCAR system, which includes about 96 percent of the nation’s nursing
homes, is used to determine whether nursing homes are complying with
federal regulations. Most OSCAR data elements are self-reported and reflect
data at the time of the survey, so concerns exist about the accuracy of these
data (Abt Associates 2000, 2001; Zhang and Grabowski 2004). Despite these
concerns, OSCAR provides the most comprehensive national source of
facility-level information on the operations, resident characteristics, and
regulatory compliance of nursing homes in the United States. (Zinn 1993;
Cawley, Grabowski, and Hirth 2006).
The OSCAR data were linked to data on specific state staffing standards,
state Medicaid per-diem rates, and market (county) conditions. State mini-
mum staffing standards came from two published reports (Harrington 2002;
DHHS 2003). State Medicaid per-diem rates were obtained from the Brown
University Survey of State Policies and State Data Book on Long-Term Care
Program and Market Characteristics (Harrington et al. 1999; Grabowski et al.
2004). Market level variables were obtained from the Area Resource File, a
publicly available dataset containing economic and demographic variables for
each county (DHHS 2006). Data on the population for each county came from
the U.S. Census Bureau.
To eliminate possibly erroneous outliers in staffing from OSCAR,
this study adopted the exclusion criteria developed by the Centers for Med-
icare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Facilities were excluded if they reported (1)
more residents than beds, (2) no RN hours and had 60 or more beds (because
federal regulations require homes with 60 or more beds to have an RN on duty
for 8 hours a day 7 days a week and a licensed nurse on duty evenings
and nights), (3) more than 12 HPRD and o0.5 total HPRD (to avoid
the unrealistically high or low staffing hours), (4) or zero residents. The original
database included 18,275 facilities; on the basis of these exclusion criteria,
436 facilities (2.4 percent) were excluded. In addition, 2,271 hospital-based
facilities were eliminated because hospital-based facilities are very different in
terms of resident severity and care practice, and 343 Medicare-only-certified
facilities were eliminated because of their focus on short-stay residents after
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hospitalization. Eight more facilities were excluded due to missing values. A
total of 55,248 facility-year observations from 15,217 freestanding Medicaid-
only or dually certified facilities from the 50 states and the District of Columbia
were analyzed.
Dependent Variables: Staffing and Quality of Care
The staffing variables were constructed as HPRD by licensure type (i.e., RNs,
LPNs, NAs) and total staff. Each facility reports the number of full-time
equivalent positions (employees or contract workers) over the previous
14 days. To convert the HPRD, the total staff hours reported in a 2-week
period was multiplied by 70 hours and then divided by the total residents and
by the 14 days in the reporting period, which is a standard conversion used by
CMS and other studies (Harrington 2002; Zhang and Grabowski 2004).
The six quality measures chosen for this study are standard measures
following the Institute of Medicine (1986) recommendations (Abt Associates
2003; Grabowski, Angelelli, and Mor 2004; Rantz et al. 2004). Resident out-
comes were measured by the rates of pressure sores, contractures, and bladder
incontinence. Pressure sores, which are preventable and treatable, are an
adverse outcome regardless of the residents’ underlying health (Grabowski
1999). Contractures, which are related to having a restriction of full passive
range of motion of any joint due to deformity, disuse, or pain (Cowles 2002),
can be caused by lack of movement that may occur under conditions
of limited staff availability. The rates of catheter use and restraint use were
used to measure process of care. Urethral catheterization places the resident at
greater risk for urinary track infection and other complications (Cawley,
Grabowski, and Hirth 2006). Physical restraints may increase the risk of
pressure sores, depression, mental and physical deterioration, and mortality
(Zinn 1993). Overall facility quality is measured by total number of facility
survey deficiencies.
Key Independent Variables: Staffing Standards
The explanatory variables of key interest indicate whether the state changed
standards (regardless of staff type) for a given year. Two dummy variables are
constructed to specify two different levels of treatment effects: ‘‘transition
effects’’ and ‘‘steady-state effects.’’ The transition effect variable captures the
immediate short-term response, while the persistent (steady-state) effect of
policy changes was estimated with a 1-year lag in order to allow for a transition
year. Each facility-year observation could be a control or treatment group for
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estimating two different policy effects. Presentation of the results focuses on
the steady-state effects because the effect of policy changes may occur after
some lead time. But OSCAR measurement of staffing may occur before or
after the actual start of new standards in a calendar year. Therefore, estimating
transition effects should also help to reduce possible measurement error.
To indicate low-staff facilities, both licensed and unlicensed staffing in
each year were compared with the required staffing in the next year to see if
current staffing was lower than what was required in the next year. A facility
was defined as low-staff if current staffing was less in any 1 year than next year
required staffing.
Covariates
Several variables were used to control for changes over time in facility, market,
and state characteristics. Time-varying facility characteristics available from
OSCAR included ownership, whether the facility was part of a chain, percent
of residents on Medicare, bed size, occupancy rate, and information on res-
ident case mix. Resident case mix was measured at the facility level by the sum
of average activities of daily living (ADL) index and skilled service index
(Cowles 2002). The ADL index is the average of the percent of residents who
are bedfast or chairbound or need assistance with eating, toileting, and trans-
ferring, weighted by the amount of assistance needed. The skilled service
index is a sum of the percentages of residents utilizing intravenous therapy,
suctioning, respiratory therapy, tracheostomy care, and parenteral feeding. In
addition, the rates of pressure sores, contractures, catheter use, and restraint
use on admission were included in each quality regression to capture baseline
case mix differences between the facilities.
Time-varying market variables included a Herfindahl–Hirschman
index (HHI) as a proxy for market competition: the HHI varies from 0 to 1,
with 0 indicating perfect competition and 1 indicating monopoly. As in
previous studies (Grabowski 2001; Mukamel, Spector, and Bajorska 2005),
excess demand was defined as the average number of empty beds per 1,000
community-dwelling elderly (651) in the county. The annual average per
capita income and the unemployment rate were included to control for county
economic conditions. The population of the elderly aged 85 and older in the
county was used as a market determinant of demand for nursing home care
and, therefore, for nursing home staffing. The size of the female population
aged 15–44 was used as a proxy for availability of long-term care workers.
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Many states implemented other initiatives at the same time they
changed their minimum staffing requirements. The Medicaid per-diem rate,
which was included because rate increases may affect staffing and quality of
care, was used as a continuous measure in 2002 dollars.
Estimation Strategy
A challenge to estimating the effect of minimum staffing standards is control-
ling for the unobserved heterogeneity associated with staffing/quality changes
over time. Staffing and quality are likely to be influenced by unobserved
characteristics such as the organizational cultures, practice skill of the nurse
workforce, overall population health needs, and state political, regulatory, or
fiscal conditions. Ignoring this heterogeneity may result in biased estimates if
these unmeasured factors are correlated with variation in minimum staffing
standards. For example, if an unobserved measure of facility or state political
culture is positively associated with staffing/quality of care but negatively
related to the implementation of staffing regulations, then the effect of staffing
standard changes will be underestimated.
The policy changes occurred at diverse times across states, so the present
study exploits this natural experiment by using a Difference-in-Differences
(DD) model with facility fixed effects to estimate the effect of staffing standard
changes on staffing/quality of care with pre–post and treatment–control
groups. The approach is analogous to a reduced-form model that does not
estimate the effect of staffing on quality but instead estimates the effect of the
overall package of reforms implemented from 1998 through 2001. The model
specification is
Yist ¼ a0 þ bMSSst þ gXist þ dYearDt þ mi þ eist ð1Þ
where the subscript i indexes nursing home, s indexes state, and t indexes year.
Yist is the actual level of staffing and measures of quality of care. MSSst is a
vector of the main treatment effects specified by two policy variables (tran-
sition and steady-state) and their interactions with the indicators of low-staff
facility and for-profit status. Xist is a vector of facility, county, and state level
time-varying covariates. A vector of year dummy variables (YearDt) accounts
for unobserved time fixed effects that might affect staffing/quality of care
and are correlated with the implementation or expansion of state standards.
The error term consists of a fixed facility-specific error component (mi)
and a mean zero random error component (eist). (Breusch–Pagan and
Hausman specification tests confirmed that fixed effects were preferred to
random effects specifications.) Triple interaction terms with for-profit status
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were included to assess the differential behavior of nursing homes in response
to policy changes.
The parameters of equation (1) were estimated with ordinary least
squares (OLS) for the models of staffing and outcome (pressure sores, con-
tractures, bladder incontinence, catheter use, and restraint use). A negative
binomial (NB) model was used for the number of deficiencies. Regression
results for all models can be found in online Appendices. Marginal effects
were calculated incorporating the effects of the various interactions in the
models. In a nonlinear model such as the number of deficiencies, however,
interpretation of the interaction terms is complex and cannot be determined
directly from regression results (Ai and Norton 2003). Therefore, marginal
effects on deficiencies were determined as the average effects across full




The first three columns in Table 2 show summary statistics for all facilities. The
low-staff variable in this study does not represent facilities that were below
current standards, but instead identifies facilities that had to increase staffing to
become compliant with new standards in the next period. By this definition, 49
percent of the facilities (N 5 7,248) were low-staff. The rightmost three col-
umns in Table 2 compare the mean values of all variables for facilities with
relatively low staffing and those with relatively high staffing. The low-staff
facilities were more likely for-profit and chain affiliated, and had slightly fewer
residents on Medicare and fewer beds than their counterparts. The low-staff
facilities were more likely to be in counties with relatively greater elderly and
female population, while the states where low-staff facilities were located were
more likely to increase staffing standards and have less generous Medicaid
reimbursement rates.
Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Staffing
Table 3 shows significant variation in the marginal steady-state effects of state
standards across the subsets of facilities. Only nonprofit facilities had statis-
tically significant increases at po.05 in RN, NA, and total staff hours in
response to the change in standards, with larger increases at low-staff facilities.
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No ( 5 0) Yes ( 5 1)
Mean Mean t-Test
Staffing hours per resident day
RN HPRD 0.34 (0, 10.23) 0.32 0.42 0.26 nnn
LPN HPRD 0.65 (0, 9.64) 0.38 0.71 0.60 nnn
NA HPRD 1.94 (0, 10.65) 0.68 2.20 1.66 nnn
Total HPRD 2.93 (0.5, 11.98) 0.95 3.33 2.51 nnn
Quality of care
% Pressure sores 6.47 (0, 100) 4.77 6.38 6.57 nnn
% Contractures 25.72 (0, 100) 20.47 27.98 23.38 nnn
% Incontinence 54.50 (0, 100) 15.91 56.33 52.61 nnn
% Catheter use 6.05 (0, 100) 4.91 6.07 6.04
% Restraint use 11.87 (0, 100) 13.02 11.34 12.43 nnn
Total deficiencies 5.91 (0, 50) 5.88 5.16 6.68 nnn
Policy: staffing standards
Transition effect 0.101 0.301 0.083 0.119 nnn
Steady-state effect 0.103 0.304 0.070 0.136 nnn
Facility
Ownership
For-profit 0.73 0.44 0.64 0.82 nnn
Nonprofit 0.23 0.42 0.30 0.15 nnn
Government 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.03 nnn
Chain 0.58 0.49 0.53 0.63 nnn
Payer mix
% Residents paid by
Medicare
7.48 (0, 100) 8.68 8.37 6.56 nnn
% Residents paid by
Medicaid
67.89 (0, 100) 19.82 65.58 70.28 nnn
% Residents paid by
others
24.63 (0, 100) 18.78 26.06 23.16 nnn
Total beds 114.82 (5, 1231) 65.98 118.57 110.95 nnn
Occupancy rate 84.63 (1.56, 100) 15.28 85.29 83.95 nnn
Case mix
Acuity index 10.08 (3, 21.70) 1.54 10.28 9.86 nnn
% Pressure sores on
admission
3.10 (0, 100) 4.17 3.105 3.102
% Contractures on
admission
16.21 (0, 100) 17.13 17.88 14.49 nnn
% Catheter use on
admission
4.24 (0, 93.02) 4.30 4.24 4.23
% Restraint use on
admission
3.82 (0, 100) 8.17 3.46 4.19 nnn
Low-staff 0.49 0.50 0 1
continued
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About two-thirds of the increase in total staff hours was due to increases in NA
hours. Staffing did increase slightly ( po.10) at a few other facility types, but
these changes were substantively small on average across all facilities within
the subgroup. Surprisingly, a decrease in total staffing hours was estimated for
for-profit facilities with relatively high staffing levels; this effect, which was
substantively small and only marginally significant at po.10 despite the large
sample size, may reflect a response by for-profit facilities to reduce staffing
closer to the legislated minimum.
The substantive implications of staffing increases for nonprofit low-staff
facilities are best understood by converting the observed changes to estimated
staff time increases. In low-staff nonprofit facilities, the increased standards led
to estimated steady-state increases of 0.034 RN HPRD (2.04 minutes), 0.027
LPN HPRD (1.62 minutes), 0.145 NA HPRD (8.7 minutes), and 0.206 total










0.196 (0.004, 1) 0.228 0.190 0.203 nnn
Empty beds per 1,000
elderly (651)
13.08 (0, 173.91) 13.06 11.28 14.93 nnn
Per capita income (in
$1,000s)
26.87 (0, 92.98) 7.62 27.59 26.13 nnn
Unemployment rate
(161)
4.51 (0.70, 29.90) 2.10 4.42 4.61 nnn
Population 851 (in
1,000s)
9.88 (0.01, 114.98) 19.63 7.64 12.20 nnn
Female population
15–44 (in 1,000s)
160.84 (0.12, 2210.65) 373.79 114.91 208.28 nnn
State




No. of facilities 15,217 7,969 7,248
nnnSignificant at 1%.
HPRD, hours per resident day; SD, standard deviation. Mean comparison tests (t-test) by low-staff
status.
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may not be sufficient to result in significant improvements in quality, as
explored in the next section.
Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Quality of Care
The hypothesis that increases in state standards improve the quality of care
would be supported by negative estimated effects because the quality
measures were constructed as adverse outcomes. None of the coefficients
for resident outcomes (rates of onset of pressure sores, contractures, or in-
continence) was significantly associated with increases in minimum standards
(Table 4).
With respect to the process of care measures, catheter use was similarly
not significantly affected by increases in minimum standards, though the rate
of restraint use declined significantly ( po.01) for all facility subgroups. The
largest decline occurred in nonprofit facilities; the decline was smaller in low-
staff nonprofit facilities than in nonprofit facilities that did not have low-staff
status (1.27 versus 2.45 percentage points).
Similarly, total deficiency citations declined significantly for all facility
subgroups except for for-profit facilities with relatively high staffing levels. The
Table 3: Marginal Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Staffing
(DD Models)
RN HPRD LPN HPRD NA HPRD Total HPRD
Panel A: low-staff
For-profit 0.009  0.0004 0.025n 0.033n
(0.006) (0.0076) (0.014) (0.017)
[1.5 minutes] [1.98 minutes]
Nonprofit 0.034nnn 0.027n 0.145nnn 0.206nnn
(0.011) (0.014) (0.026) (0.033)
[2.04 minutes] [1.62 minutes] [8.7 minutes] [12.36 minutes]
Panel B: not low-staff
For-profit  0.011  0.015  0.022  0.049n
(0.008) (0.011) (0.020) (0.025)
[ 2.94 minutes]
Nonprofit 0.016n 0.006  0.029  0.007




HPRD, hours per resident day. Standard errors in parentheses. Minutes in brackets.
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average effect for nonprofit facilities with relatively high staffing levels showed
the largest reduction in deficiencies on average with 0.2 relative to an overall
mean number of deficiencies of 5.9.
DISCUSSION
This study assesses the impact of state minimum staffing standards on the level
of staffing and quality of care by exploiting differences in the timing of policy
changes from 1998 to 2001. The findings for effects on staffing suggest that
increased standards matter particularly for nonprofit homes with staffing lev-
els previously below or close to new standards. Those low-staff facilities are
more likely to face penalties for failing to meet new regulatory standards;
therefore, unless they can obtain an exemption they must increase staffing to
avoid penalties in the next period. Facilities already operating higher staffing
than new standards did not show any improvement in their staffing level, with
an indication (not significant at conventional levels) that for-profit homes with
staffing previously above the required level may have reduced staffing slightly.
As noted by Kovner and Heinrich (2000) and Mueller et al. (2006), facilities
Table 4: Marginal Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Quality of
Care (DD Models)
Resident Outcomes Care Process Measures Overall Facility
Pressure Sores Contractures Incontinence Catheter Use Restraint Use Deficienciesw
Panel A: low-staff
For-profit 0.170  0.434  0.067  0.077  0.682nnn  0.107nn
(0.108) (0.322) (0.351) (0.088) (0.254) (0.051)
Nonprofit  0.134 0.156  0.497 0.095  1.266nnn  0.102nn
(0.204) (0.606) (0.662) (0.165) (0.479) (0.049)
Panel B: not low-staff
For-profit 0.019  0.140 0.228 0.047  1.152nnn  0.023
(0.157) (0.467) (0.510) (0.127) (0.369) (0.055)
Nonprofit 0.263 0.530  0.598  0.052  2.450nnn  0.200nnn
(0.162) (0.481) (0.526) (0.131) (0.380) (0.041)
nnSignificant at 5%.
nnnSignificant at 1%.
(Standard errors in parentheses).
wEffects were shown as the average effects across full samples. Standard errors were generated by
using bootstrapping with 300 repetitions.
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where staffing exceeded the minimums may actually decrease staffing (i.e., if
nursing homes assume they only have to comply with the minimum levels to
ensure safe practice).
Analyses of the effects on quality show that increased standards were
associated with reduced restraint use and deficiencies on average at all types of
facilities. Resident outcomes and catheter use, however, show no change in
response to increased standards, possibly for several reasons. First, staffing
may be a better predictor of facility care processes than the clinical outcomes
examined. Resident outcome aggregated at the facility level may not be very
sensitive to the modest level of staffing changes induced by the regulation.
Furthermore, the aggregated case-mix severity measures may not adequately
control for within-facility variation. Finally, the staffing increases may not have
been sufficient to improve average resident outcomes at the facility level.
Reductions in restraint use and total deficiencies that occur in conjunc-
tion with increases in staffing standards do not vary by staffing status or own-
ership type, as the staffing increases did. The findings of improvement in
quality even without concomitant increases in staffing are possibly due to
either (1) a general response to increased standards or (2) other quality
improvements implemented at the same time as minimum staffing standards.
Many states implemented various quality initiatives at the same time as they
changed staffing standards. State initiatives for the long-term direct care
workforce such as wage pass-throughs and major payment changes in
Medicaid and Medicare also occurred during the study period. Yet increases
in standards could have solicited a general response by nursing homes, and
quality of care is influenced by other factors such as physical environment,
different methods of treatment, efficient use of staff and nonstaff inputs, and
their productivity differences.
Several limitations may have affected the results. First, the dummy
policy variables used did not control for the intensity of standards or repeated
changes. Some states targeted their regulations toward different types of staff,
and three states (Arkansas, Delaware, and Oklahoma) changed legislation
more than once from 1998 to 2001. Yet the dummy variable approach should
identify the overall average effect of the full set of reforms implemented from
1998 through 2001. Second, even though the DD estimation controls for
unobserved time-invariant factors which could have increased staffing or
quality of care, the improvements in some quality measures in all facilities
despite a lack of increased staffing might be due to omitted factors that
are highly correlated with standard changes (ranging from other policies to
reactions to publicity about quality problems).
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In total, the results from this study are particularly relevant to the era of
growth in the aged population and provide important policy implications. First,
structural differences in the effects of minimum standards on staffing by pre-
vious staffing status or ownership type demonstrate variation in response to
regulatory policies. Not surprisingly, mandated staffing standards seem to pri-
marily affect facilities at the low-end of the staffing spectrum and, therefore,
some incentive structures need to be developed to improve staffing at all fa-
cilities. Second, although the results indicate that the increases in standards
were associated with reductions in restraint use and deficiencies, broad im-
provements in quality of care cannot be achieved merely by the types of
staffing standards. Other quality initiatives need to be considered, such as
developing training standards, staff education, and retention strategies. Third,
the federal and state governments should determine the additional costs and
develop a plan to adequately fund the required increases in staffing levels.
Fourth, a number of facilities still appear to operate at staffing levels below the
mandated levels. In order to achieve the benefits of mandatory staffing standards,
monitoring and enforcement of federal and state regulations are necessary.
Lastly, the results are useful to understand the benefits and pitfalls of im-
plementing staffing standards. Further understanding of the effects of minimum
staffing standards may be obtained by assessing financial pressures and by ex-
ploring the causal pathways between nursing home staffing and quality outcomes.
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